The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), signed into law Aug. 16, 2022, reshapes aspects of drug pricing and insurance
policy in the United States. Key provisions within the IRA aim to reduce out-of-pocket expenses and improve
access to essential treatments, particularly for Medicare beneficiaries. These provisions include granting
Medicare the authority to negotiate prices for certain costly drugs covered by Medicare, capping insulin costs
at $35 per month among Medicare enrollees, reducing out-of-pocket costs under Medicare Part D and eliminating
expenses for adult vaccines recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). The law also
introduces inflation-based rebates that require manufacturers to pay Medicare when drug prices increase faster
than inflation. As these changes are phased in — with most changes occurring from 2023 to 2029 — early
observation of their effects on medication access and patient behavior can begin to be analyzed.
Among the most closely watched elements of the IRA is the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program (MDPNP), which
began with the selection of 10 Part D drugs in 2023, with pricing and reimbursement-related changes set to take
effect Jan. 1, 2026 [otherwise known as initial price applicability year (IPAY) 2026]. Public response has been
mixed: Patient advocacy groups and policy experts applauded the legislation as a long-overdue shift toward
affordability and transparency, while the pharmaceutical industry mounted legal challenges and voiced concerns
about potential impacts on innovation. As implementation advances, manufacturers, providers and policymakers are
closely monitoring changes in pricing dynamics, market behavior and the broader implications for healthcare
sustainability.
How the IRA is shaping healthcare
Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program (MDPNP)
Under the IRA, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services secretary is required to negotiate prices for select
single-source drugs under Medicare Part D (retail prescription drugs) starting in 2026 and Part B
(physician-administered drugs) starting in 2028. These negotiations aim to lower prescription drug costs for
Medicare beneficiaries and reduce overall program spending.
The negotiation process is structured and phased. It began in 2023 with the identification of the first 10
high-expenditure Part D drugs eligible for negotiation. To qualify, a drug must be among the top-spending,
single-source brand products in Medicare, have been on the market for at least seven years (for small molecules)
or 11 years (for biologics) and lack generic or biosimilar competition. The selected drugs for IPAY 2026 are:
- Apixaban (Eliquis)
- Dapagliflozin (Farxiga)
- Empagliflozin (Jardiance)
- Etanercept (Enbrel)
- Ibrutinib (Imbruvica)
- Insulin aspart (Fiasp/NovoLog)
- Rivaroxaban (Xarelto)
- Sacubitril/valsartan (Entresto)
- Sitagliptin (Januvia)
- Ustekinumab (Stelara)
Methodology
The top 100 Medicare Part B and Part D drugs by total spend were identified from the Centers for
Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) Part B and Part D Drug Spending Dashboards (2023 final report). For each
product, WAC
data were obtained from the Medi-Span Price Rx database to capture all price changes within the
study period.
The pre-policy periods were defined as October 2020 through September 2022 for Part D and January
2021 through
December 2022 for Part B, while the post-policy periods extended from October 2022 to September 2025
for Part D
and January 2023 to September 2025 for Part B. Data were compiled in Microsoft Excel and included
the following
fields: drug name, national drug code (NDC) or Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System code,
manufacturer,
date of price change, WAC price, source and notes. The products exempt from the IRA and from this
analysis
include vaccines, plasma-derived products, medical supplies, diabetic testing supplies,
viscosupplements and
biosimilar products. Only products with complete pricing information during both the pre-policy and
post-policy
periods were included, and thus any products that received initial U.S. Food and Drug Administration
approval
during these periods were excluded.
For each NDC, the WAC prices were identified for both the pre- and post-policy periods to calculate
percentage point
changes over each timeframe. These NDC-level changes were then aggregated to the product level by
taking the
median price change across all NDCs associated with each product.
Two complementary analyses were conducted. First, products were grouped into four categories based on
their
pre-policy annual price growth [low (0–5%), medium (6–10%), mid-range (11–15%) and high (>15%)]
to assess
whether baseline inflation levels were associated with different post-policy pricing patterns. For
each tier,
the approximate change in percentage points was calculated as the median of product-level
differences in annual
price growth between the post- and pre-policy periods, rather than as the simple difference between
the
tier-level medians.
Second, to evaluate how individual products’ pricing behavior shifted relative to their own
historical norms, each
product’s pre-policy annual WAC growth rate served as a baseline for typical pricing behavior.
Post-policy
growth rates were compared against this baseline and categorized to demonstrate the rate of price
changes and
characterize the distribution of product-level changes in pricing behavior.
Four categories demonstrated the rate of price changes:
- Price decrease: Prices declined during the post-policy period.
- Slower rate of price increase (deceleration): Prices continued to rise, but at a slower
pace than
before.
- Same rate of price increase: The pace of price growth remained stable, showing little to
no change.
- Faster rate of price increase (acceleration): Prices rose more quickly than in the
pre-policy period.
This framework distinguishes true price decreases and slower — but still positive — price growth and
identifies
products that maintained or accelerated price increases, highlighting how pricing behavior
redistributed across
the market rather than shifting uniformly in one direction.
Impact on drug pricing analysis
Medicare Part B
The Medicare Part B dataset included 62 products encompassing 127 NDCs that represented a range of
physician-administered drugs. All products analyzed are single-source, brand-name drugs, making them
eligible
for potential inclusion in the Medicare Part B negotiation program once that phase of the policy is
implemented.
From the pre-policy window of January 2021 through December 2022 and the post policy window of
January 2023 to
September 2025, the median annual WAC growth rose from 6.5% pre-policy to 13.3% post-policy period
—roughly
double the pre-policy pace (+6.3 percentage points).
Table 1 compares median pre- and post-policy annual WAC growth by baseline inflation tier.
Most
products (n=30) fell in the medium starting tier (6–10%) and exhibited the largest increase in
growth, rising from
6.9% pre-policy to 14.1% post-policy (+6.5 percentage points). Products with the lowest baseline
inflation (0–5%,
n=12) also accelerated, increasing from 2.4% to 4.8% (+3.7 percentage points). Mid-range starters
(11–15%, n=11)
rose more modestly, from 10.3% to 15.3% (+3.9 percentage points), while products with the highest
pre-policy growth
(>15%, n=9) remained elevated, increasing from 15.5% to 21.2% (+5.9 percentage points). Across
all tiers, median
post-policy growth exceeded pre-policy levels, indicating broad-based price acceleration in Part B.
Table 1. Part B tiered pricing behavior by starting price
growth
| Pre-policy tier (rounded) |
Products (count) |
Median pre |
Median post |
Median change* (percentage points) |
| 0–5% |
12 |
2.4% |
4.8% |
+3.7 |
| 6–10% |
30 |
6.9% |
14.1% |
+6.5 |
| 11–15% |
11 |
10.3% |
15.3% |
+3.9 |
| >15% |
9 |
15.5% |
21.2% |
+5.9 |
Note:
* For each tier, the approximate change in percentage points was calculated as the
median of product-level differences in annual price growth between the post- and
pre-policy periods, rather than as the simple difference between the tier-level medians.
Figure 1 shows the distribution post-IRA rates of price changes for Medicare Part B products
(n=62). The vast
majority — about 90% — moved to a faster rate of price increase while only a small share held at the
same rate
(5%) or slowed (5%), and none demonstrated a price decrease. Taken together, these results indicate
that
following IRA implementation, Part B pricing accelerated in a clear, consistent pattern with the
speed-up
strongest among lower-growth starters but evident across every tier, signaling a market that has
shifted toward
faster price growth rather than price restraint.
Figure 1. Medicare Part B – Post-IRA rate of price change by product
Medicare Part D
The Medicare Part D dataset included 85 products encompassing 339 NDCs that represented a range of
retail and
specialty drugs reimbursed under Part D. From October 2020 through September 2022, the median
pre-policy cohort
annual WAC growth was 10.5%. In the post-policy period (October 2022 to September 2025), it rose to
12.0%, a
+1.5 percentage point change.
Table 2 compares median pre- and post-policy annual WAC growth by baseline tier. Products with
lower
pre-policy growth posted the largest increases: low starters (0–5%, n=10) rose from 4.0% to 12.5%
(+8.0
percentage points), and medium starters (6–10%, n=45) moved from 9.0% to 12.0% (+5.0 percentage
points).
Mid-range starters (11–15%, n=21) increased more modestly from 12.0% to 14.0%, +2.0 percentage
points), while
high starters (>15%, n=12) slowed on average from 17.0% to 10.5%, −6.0 pp). Taken together, the
tiers show a
compression pattern: lower-growth products accelerated the most, mid-tier products edged higher and
the
highest-growth group leveled off.
Table 2. Part D tiered pricing behavior by starting price
growth
| Pre-policy tier (rounded) |
Products (count) |
Median pre |
Median post |
Median change* (percentage points) |
| 0–5% |
10 |
4.0% |
12.5% |
+8.0 |
| 6–10% |
45 |
9.0% |
12.0% |
+5.0 |
| 11–15% |
21 |
12.0% |
14.0% |
+2.0 |
| >15% |
12 |
17.0% |
10.5% |
-6.0 |
Note:
* For each tier, the approximate change in percentage points was calculated as the
median of product-level differences in annual price growth between the post- and
pre-policy periods, rather than as the simple difference between the tier-level medians.
Following policy implementation, most Part D products continued to experience positive price growth,
with 71%
increasing at a faster rate than before the IRA (Figure 2). At the same time, 19% of products showed
a slower
rate of price increase, 5% of products demonstrated the same rate as the pre-policy time period and
5% showed a
price decrease. These results indicate a more varied pattern of post-policy pricing behavior in Part
D,
reflecting a mix of accelerations, slowdowns and selective reductions — contrasting with the more
uniform upward
shift observed in Part B.
Figure 2. Medicare Part D – Post-IRA rate of price change by product
Pricing behavior among IRA-negotiated drugs
To assess whether negotiated status is associated with distinct pricing behavior, a separate analysis
was conducted
on the first 10 products selected for Medicare price negotiation, which prices take effect Jan. 1,
2026. The
pre- and post- policy patterns were compared with the broader Part D market to evaluate any
differences
attributable to negotiation exposure.
Before policy implementation, annual WAC growth among the 10 negotiated drugs ranged from 6% to 18%.
In the
post-policy period, that range widened from 9% to 24%, showing greater variability in price
movement. Six of the
10 products — apixaban (Eliquis), dapagliflozin (Farxiga), empagliflozin (Jardiance), etanercept
(Enbrel),
rivaroxaban (Xarelto) and ustekinumab (Stelara) — experienced overall price acceleration. In
contrast, four
products — ibrutinib (Imbruvica), insulin aspart (Fiasp/NovoLog), sacubitril/valsartan (Entresto)
and
sitagliptin (Januvia) — showed slower growth or outright price decreases (Table 3).
Table 3. Negotiated drug pricing behavior (product-level)
| Generic (brand) |
NDC (count) |
Median pre % |
Median post % |
Change (percentage points) |
| Faster rate of price increase
|
| Etanercept (Enbrel) |
6 |
18.0 |
24.0 |
+6.0 |
| Rivaroxaban (Xarelto) |
18 |
10.0 |
16.0 |
+6.0 |
| Ustekinumab (Stelara) |
4 |
10.0 |
14.0 |
+4.0 |
| Apixaban (Eliquis) |
5 |
12.0 |
15.0 |
+3.0 |
| Dapagliflozin (Farxiga) |
2 |
6.0 |
9.0 |
+3.0 |
| Empagliflozin (Jardiance) |
6 |
9.0 |
10.0 |
+1.0 |
| Slower rate of price increase
|
| Ibrutinib (Imbruvica) |
6 |
15.0 |
13.0 |
−2.0 |
| Sacubitril/valsartan (Entresto) |
6 |
17.0 |
11.0 |
−6.0 |
| Price decrease |
| Insulin aspart (Fiasp/NovoLog) |
14 |
0 |
−75.0 |
−75.0 |
| Sitagliptin (Januvia) |
13 |
10.0 |
−37.0 |
−47.0 |
Insulin aspart: A unique outlier
Unlike other negotiated products, insulin aspart recorded no price growth during the pre-policy
period, maintaining
stable pricing across all presentations. On Jan. 1, 2024, all NDCs underwent a single, synchronized
list-price
decrease, ranging from −50% to −75%, marking it as the drug with the largest price reduction across
the
analysis.
Part D summary
Overall, Medicare Part D pricing between January 2023 and September 2025 reflects a redistribution of
price behavior
rather than a single, uniform trend. Using two complementary analyses — grouping products by
pre-policy
inflation tiers and comparing each product’s post-policy growth rate to its own historical baseline
— most
products continued to raise prices, but at markedly different speeds. Products with low to moderate
pre-policy
inflation (0–10%) showed the largest increases in median price growth, while those with the highest
baseline
inflation (>15%) generally slowed, producing a compression effect across the market. At the same
time,
product-level analyses revealed that a substantial majority accelerated their rate of price
increase, whereas a
meaningful minority slowed, flattened or decreased prices altogether.
This blended pattern underscores a diversifying manufacturer response: Lower-growth products appear
to have used
available headroom to raise prices, mid-range brands moved up more modestly and high-growth products
largely
leveled off. The same continuum extends to drugs subject to a negotiated MFP, where mixed behavior
suggests that
IRA provisions are shaping strategy in different ways — some products accelerating within new bounds
and others
decelerating or implementing one-time price resets, such as the 2024 list-price reduction for
insulin aspart.
Together, these findings indicate that the IRA may have introduced greater variation and
segmentation in pricing
behavior across Part D, producing both moderation and acceleration depending on where products
started and how
they are affected by new policy constraints.